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鉴于业绩承诺违约事件频发的严峻现实，如何提高业绩承诺达标成为亟待解决的问题。本文从机构投资者实地调研的视角，以2009—2019年深交所A股上市公司业绩承诺履约期已完成的并购事件为样本，研究其对并购业绩承诺达标的影响及机制。研究发现，机构投资者实地调研可以显著提高业绩承诺达标。在代理成本较高和外部监督力量较弱的公司，机构投资者实地调研对业绩承诺达标的正向影响更加显著，表明机构投资者实地调研具有治理溢出效应。进一步研究发现，并购方以股份、股份+现金混合方式支付时，以及并购方持有标的方股份越多时，机构投资者实地调研对业绩承诺达标的作用更加显著；独立型机构投资者持股时，可以显著提高机构投资者实地调研与业绩承诺达标的正相关关系；承诺期内被调研的公司，业绩承诺达标不仅降低了承诺期满首年标的企业业绩发生“变脸”的可能性，而且还降低了承诺期满并购方首年计提商誉减值的可能性。研究对理解机构投资者实地调研对并购业绩承诺履约的作用具有理论价值和现实意义。
Abstract：In view of the grim reality of frequent defaults of performance commitments, how to improve the achievement of performance commitments has became an important issue. This paper studies the impact of institutional investors' corporate site visits on the achievement of performance commitments and its mechanism. The results show that institutional investors' corporate site visits can significantly improve the achievement of performance commitment. In companies with higher agency costs and weaker external governance, the impact of institutional investors' corporate site visits on the achievement of performance commitments is more significant, which indicates that corporate site visits have governance spillover effects. Further, it is found that when the acquirer adopts equity, equity&cash payment, and when the acquirer holds more target's shares, corporate site visits play a more significant role in achieving the performance commitments. Independent institutional investors holding shares can improve the positive correlation between corporate site visits and the performance commitment. For companies visited during the commitment period, the achievement of performance commitments not only reduces the possibility of impairment of goodwill in the first year after the commitment expires, but also reduces the possibility of performance change of the target enterprises in the first year after the commitment expires. This paper has theoretical and practical significance for understanding the effect of institutional investors' corporate site visits on the performance commitment of M&A.
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(1)为了减少样本偏差的影响,本文使用PSM方法(1∶2)匹配的样本进行了回归,结果仍然一致。
(2)为了减少样本偏差的影响,本文也用PSM方法(1∶2)匹配的样本进行了回归,结果仍然一致。
(3)业绩承诺期满首年计提的商誉减值加1的自然对数。
(4)借鉴窦炜等(2019)的做法,本文以承诺期满首年标的财务绩效相较于承诺期满当年标的财务绩效的变动幅度(A_Roat+1)作为业绩变脸(B_Roat+1)的衡量指标,A_Roat+1的计算方式为(承诺期满首年标的资产收益率—承诺期满当年标的资产收益率)÷承诺期满当年标的资产收益率,并在此基础上减去标的所在行业的业绩变化均值。本文定义“业绩变脸”为在减去标的所在行业的业绩变化均值的基础上,业绩下降幅度大于20%,即A_Roat+1小于-0.2时,B_Roat+1取值为1,否则为0,以25%作为下降幅度进行稳健性检验。
基本信息:
DOI：
中图分类号:F832.51;F271
引用信息:
[1]黎文飞,陈楚芬.机构投资者实地调研能提高业绩承诺达标吗？[J].金融学季刊,2022,16(03):72-95.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金青年项目（71702038）; 教育部人文社科青年基金项目（21YJC630055）的资助