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本文通过考察企业信息披露对投资者获取内部信息决策的影响,证明了企业公共信息质量与资本成本之间存在着先下降后上升的关系。一方面,所有企业自愿选择的信息披露质量都小于社会最优值,监管机构应该通过披露监管强制企业提高信息披露质量;另一方面,随着企业规模的增加,自愿选择的信息披露质量和社会最优值都会相应增加。因此对于大企业,尽管其信息披露质量高于小企业,但是仍然低于社会最优,所以应该对大企业或者企业规模大的股票市场实行更严格的监管。而对于小企业而言,统一监管要求的信息披露质量已经高于小企业的社会最优值,因此对小企业或者企业规模小的股票市场则应该实行相对宽松的监管。
Abstract：This paper consider the effect of firms' information disclosure on the investors' decision of whether to acquire private information. We prove that there is a nonlinear relation between the quality of public information and the cost of capital. All firms' voluntary disclosure levels are below the social optimal ones,regulators can improve the quality of public information by disclosure regulations; on the other hand,voluntary disclosure levels and social optimal ones are positively related with firm size. So for large firms,although its disclosure levels are higher than small firms,but they are still lower than social optimal,thus large firms or stock markets with large firms should be supervised more strictly. For small firms,disclosure levels determined by regulations are higher than their social optimal,thus small firms or markets with small firms ought to be supervised relatively more loosely.
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[1]我们依据现有文献,希望提高公共信息质量能够降低资本成本。因此将能够降低资本成本的效应称为“正向效应”,而将提高资本成本的效应称为“负向效应”。
[2]参数的选择不会影响文章的数值模拟结果,因此我们在正文中只报告一种模拟的具体结果。而为了稳健起见,我们将其他参数下的模拟结果放在附录中以供参考。
基本信息:
中图分类号:F275
引用信息:
[1]李宏泰,杨云红.信息披露、披露监管与资本成本[J].金融学季刊,2013,7(01):1-25.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金资助项目“资本市场中信息不对称与资产风险”(项目批准号:71172027);; “行为金融:心理偏差、投资行为与资产定价”(项目批准号:71021001)的资助
2013-08-31
2013-08-31