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本文选取2007—2020年我国发生并购交易的A股上市民营企业为样本,研究基于雇佣关系的CEO内部关联(下文简称为"CEO内部关联")对公司并购绩效的影响。研究发现,CEO内部关联对短期和中期的并购绩效具有显著的负向影响。进一步研究表明,CEO内部关联的负向影响仅存在于公司治理较差的公司,如CEO-董事长两职合一的公司、第二至第十大股东持股比例较低的公司或者分析师跟踪人数较少的公司。这些结果表明,CEO内部关联削弱了公司管理层(董事会)对CEO的监督和约束,但是公司内部或者外部的治理机制能对CEO形成有效的替代性的监督,从而减弱CEO内部关联的负面影响。本文的结果提示监管部门和公司股东关注高管、董事之间的内部关系,加强对高管、董事聘任过程的监督和管理,以保护公司股东的利益。
Abstract：Based on the sample of Non-SOE firms in China that had mergers and acquisition(M & A) transactions between 2007 and 2020, this paper studies the effect of appointment-based CEO connectedness on the performance of M & As. We find that appointment-based CEO connectedness has significantly negative effect on the short-term and middle-term M & A performance. Further, we show that the significantly negative effect only presents in the subsample where the CEO holds the dual role of chairman, or in the subsample for which the stock ownership of the top-2 to top-10 largest shareholders is below the sample median, or in the subsample for which the analyst coverage is below the sample median. These results suggest that appointment-based CEO connectedness weakens the monitoring from the board of directors and other executives, and that the adverse effects of the connectedness can be mitigated by various effective corporate governance mechanisms. This paper's implication is that, to protect the interest of shareholders, regulators and investors should notice the connectedness within the managers and the board of directors, and reinforce the monitoring on the recruitment of managers and directors.
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(1)这一关联在英文文献中有不同的名称,比如:co-option(Coles等,2014)、appointment-based CEO connectedness(Khanna等,2015)、internal coalition(Xu等,2020)等。本文参照Khanna等(2015)的研究,将“appointment-based CEO connectedness”译为“基于雇佣关系的CEO内部关联”,简称为“CEO内部关联”。
(2)如CEO任职后聘任的高管人数占高管总人数的比例;CEO任职后聘任的董事和高管人数占董事和高管总人数的比例等。
(3)因为有部分高管兼任董事,这一度量中的高管包含了不兼任董事的高管和兼任董事的高管(内部董事)。在稳健性检验中,我们将CEO上任后聘请的高管、董事占高管和董事总人数的比例来作为CEO内部关联的替代度量,该指标中的高管和董事则包含内部董事、外部董事和不兼任董事的高管。
(4)我们也试过不对公司规模分组,或者将公司规模分为50组,得到的结果与表5的结果相似。
基本信息:
中图分类号:F271;F272.9;F832.51;F276.5
引用信息:
[1]潘璐瑶,胡轶聪.基于雇佣关系的CEO内部关联对公司并购绩效的影响研究[J].金融学季刊,2021,15(03):1-25.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金青年项目（72002229）的资助